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Cultures in Dialogue.

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ABOUT THE MENA REPORT

The MENA Report, published monthly by The Cordoba Foundation, provides unique insights and analysis of events and developments in the Middle East and North Africa. Seeking to provide impartial, accurate and authoritative content and analysis, we do this through The Cordoba Foundation's unique access to rare and highly important primary sources in the Middle East and beyond.



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SERIES EDITORS:

Dr Anas Altikriti
Chief Executive

Dr Fareed Sabri
Head, MENA Programme

Abdullah Faliq
Head of Research & Editor

Amjad Mohamed-Saleem

Hamzah D. Foreman

DESIGN & ART DIRECTION:

Abdullah S. Khan
www.moonlight.org.uk

ABOUT THE CORDOBA FOUNDATION

Founded in 2005, The Cordoba Foundation (TCF) is an independent Public Relations, Research and Training unit, which promotes dialogue and the culture of peaceful and positive coexistence among civilisations, ideas and people. We do this by working with decision-making circles, researchers, religious leaders, the media, and a host of other stakeholders of society for better understanding and clearer comprehension of inter-communal and inter-religious issues in Britain and beyond.

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Westgate House, Level 7, Westgate Road, Ealing, London W5 1YY
Tel 020 8991 3372 / Fax 020 8991 3373
info@thecordobafoundation.com

WELCOME

Welcome to our second edition of *The MENA Report*. This edition follows events that have led to the change of Western policy towards the Arab Spring and the new governments that followed. The September 2012 attack on the American embassy in Benghazi, the rise of Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, and the Christian minority's support for president Assad are the main reasons for the policy change as Western political analysts want us to believe. If this proves to be true, the West's claim as being the bastion of freedom and democracy will be dealt a serious blow.

In the past two decades, France - among all Western countries - has been quite candid and forthcoming when it comes to fighting political Islam through homeland legislation and in its support for dictators in Africa and the Middle East. On the other hand, the Anglo-Saxon approach to fighting terrorism for the past 2 decades has only served to legitimise violent reactions among the young and angry, and disperse grievances against the West from Morocco to Bali, Indonesia.

The instability in the region will only serve to create more tensions between the two shores of the Mediterranean and accentuate the flow of refugees to Europe. Non-Western superpowers, the likes of China and emerging super-economies like Brazil, Turkey and India, are the main beneficiaries of the widening crack between the West and the Arab World.

The drive towards democracy in the region is unstoppable, but the shape of democratic regimes and the welfare of its people and its stability will depend on two major parameters. The first is the shape of political Islam adopted by the Islamist trend and whether it is malleable enough to suit the modern national state. The second is the attitude of the West towards the new democratically elected governments and its even handedness in dealing with the political make-up of communities and the different sects within the Middle East.

Dr Fareed Sabri
HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA PROGRAMME
THE CORDOBA FOUNDATION

SYRIA CIVILIAN DEATH TOLL REACHES 70,000. HOW MUCH MORE 'COLLATERAL DAMAGE' BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ACTS?

It was only last May when the French president Francois Hollande hinted at an openness to military intervention in Syria. Seven months on and with a mounting number of civilian casualties, the Syrian opposition finds itself without the promised military and financial backing. Civilians have been left at the mercy of the Syrian regime who has been granted access to endless financial and arms supplies from Iraq, Iran, and Russia in particular. Navi Pillay, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, repeated her call for the 15-member council to refer Syria to the International Criminal Court. Pillay told the council early in February that the death toll was approaching 70,000 at that time. If these numbers are accurate, it amounts to an increase of 10,000 from the start of the year.

The main backers of the Syrian regime are adamant that the European arms embargo on Syria should stay in place since they know this legislation is affecting the opposition only. In May 2011, the European Union imposed sanctions on Syria in response to the violent repression by Syrian government

forces against peaceful protestors. The sanctions included an embargo on the supply of arms, military equipment, and equipment which might be used for internal repression. In January and June 2012, and in order to strengthen the embargo, several EU Council decisions were made in more detail. While In July 2012, in an effort to address the problem of arms and other embargoed items being transported from other countries through the EU to Syria, it was decided that EU member states should inspect all vessels and aircraft bound for Syria through their territories.

This is a repeat of the Bosnian tragedy when the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 713 imposing an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. The embargo caused needless loss of civilian life and untold hardship since the Serbs were very well armed, with supplies of arms continually filtering through from Russia. Furthermore, the Republic of Serbia (*Republika Srpska*) inherited the lion's share of the Yugoslav People Army's arsenal, and the Croatian Army could smuggle weapons through its coast. The only causality

for this resolution was the land locked Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On February 13th 2013, the head of the Russian State's Arms Exporter vowed to continue supplying the Syrian army with weapons. Anatoly Isaikin told a news conference that the Russian exports did not contravene international law or U.N Security Council resolutions.

Isaikin's statement is correct since Russia and China worked very hard to block any attempt by the Security Council to impose sanctions on the Syrian regime. Our sources from inside the Syrian opposition in Turkey claimed that most of the weapons in the hands of the opposition were acquired after overrunning the Syrian Army arms' depots. The few supplies that do pass through Turkey for Syria are bought from small arms merchants with donations from people in the Gulf region. Nothing on the scale that will tip the balance in favour of the opposition fighters is allowed to pass through the Turkish borders. The same sources further elaborated on the Turkish position towards the Syrian conflict claiming that Turkey does not want to act outside

the jurisdiction of the International community or NATO's command. Turkey has its own complex social make-up. There is also substantial support for the Syrian regime among its Alawite community along the two countries' borders.

Financially, the Turkish government spent nearly a billion dollars on hosting refugee camps and the Syrian opposition on its territory. Nevertheless, the Turkish government, according to our source, is on a road of no return in its efforts to topple the Syrian regime. The Turks are convinced that the Syrian government and Iran in particular will spare no effort in propping up the Alawite and Kurdish separatists' demands in the Southern region of the country after the dust settles.

The Syrian opposition is not calling for a direct military intervention since there is no appetite for such a move among the governments of the Middle East or its people. Gallup data from 2012 shows pluralities in the Arab world with many countries opposed to NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011, suggesting that similar moves in Syria could



Iranian and Hezbollah support for the Syrian regime lost them crucial sympathy amongst people in the region.

meet similar objections. However, it needs to be noted that the majority of governments in the Middle East are undemocratic, and that their media and state propaganda portray the Syrian regime as a victim of a Western-Wahhabi conspiracy. They fear similar consequences in the future. Two years after the Gallup survey, hundreds of hours of video images of the regime's atrocities on Arab satellite TV channels have changed the perception of its Arab viewers on Iran, Hezbollah, and the Syrian regime. Before the Syrian crisis, the trio was considered by most people in the Middle East as champions of the struggle against Israel.

Iranian and Hezbollah support for the Syrian regime lost them crucial sympathy amongst people in the region. We would not be exaggerating if we say that there is a big shift in Arab and Muslim public opinion against the Iranian influence in the region. Even the Islamic resistance movement Hamas made a U-turn on its relationship with the Syrian regime and its backers.

Our researcher met with a senior member of Hamas to explore their latest position towards Syria and Iran and found it to be so rigid in light of Iran's backing the Syrian regime, that he considered Western pressure on Iran to be legitimate to end its sectarian and unwarranted intervention in the internal affairs of the Arab countries.

The West's reluctance to support the Syrian opposition and allow effective of arms shipments to enter Syria is due to the fact that there are jihadist organisations in action against the regime such as Jabhat al-Nusra. They fear that shipped weapons will eventually fall into the wrong hands and could be used in the future against Israel or Western interests. However, this policy is short-sighted and will lead to more civilian casualties. It is also likely to weaken the moderate elements among the Syrian opposition since they lack the sophisticated financial and volunteer networks which al-Qaeda affiliated networks have.

The lessons of Iraq have not been learned; the might of the

American and the Iraqi army supported by Iranian backed militias could not stop al-Qaeda or end its presence in Iraq. It was only when local tribal forces and Sunni resistance organisations got together against the foreign organisation. Only then al-Qaeda ceased to be effective or able to hold ground in any of the Sunni provinces. Jabhat al-Nusra has been very effective in weakening the regime in Syria but it will not be able to spread its hegemony to any part of Syria. This is because the Syrian social make-up is even more secular and plural than neighboring Iraq. The only chance al-Nusra has lays in the steady radicalisation of the Syrian population through the repeated traumas inflicted by the regime and the indifference of the International community.

Maintaining the European arms embargo on the Syrian opposition fighters is not a viable option since it will lead to a prolonged war. The regime will be able to consolidate its control on parts of Syria while the rest of the country will be under the jurisdiction of a plethora of Jihadi organisations. The Jihadists are very effective in resourcing weapons,

financial assistance, and fighters from neighbouring Arab countries. World powers are divided on how to stop the Syrian regime from killing its people and the Security Council is unlikely to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Permanent Security Council members Russia and China have acted as Syria's protector on the council by repeatedly blocking Western efforts to take stronger UN action. This leaves the International Community no option but to act outside the Security Council to end the impasse. European and American support for the French intervention in Mali is quite difficult to swallow given the aforementioned number of civilian casualties caused by the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Israel is playing a key role in keeping the Syrian regime in place. The Israelis believe that a new democratic government in Syria will bring the Muslim Brotherhood to power, thus outflanking the Jewish state from the North East and Egypt from the West. Israel is considering a 10-mile defensive strip filled with troops and tanks to be assembled inside the Syrian



territories with Israel to fend off Islamists should Assad fall. In our opinion, the buffer zone inside Syria will only serve to give the new government, after the eventual fall of al-Assad regime, a reason to renew hostilities since it will have the right to defend any infringement on its territories. The lessons of Southern Lebanon are still vivid when the Lebanese engaged in a war of attrition with the Israelis, culminating in their withdrawal from the Security Zone in 2000. The consequences of the security zone did not end with their withdrawal; it dragged on to the present day with a radicalised population and the rise of resistance organisations like Hizbullah.

The Syrian opposition has a lot to do to win the absolute confidence of the International Community. They should agree among themselves on democratic mechanisms and principles for Syria's future to avert the chaos we are witnessing at the moment in Egypt and Tunisia. The latest maneuver by the Syrian National Coalition leader Moaz al-Khatib to hold talks with Bashar al-Assad in rebel-held

areas of northern Syria to end a conflict that has killed about 70,000 people, took all by surprise.

According to a member of the SNC leadership council, al-Khatib did not consult them or anyone in the opposition. It was his personal initiative. The council preferred not to make an issue of his policy on the whim for fear of cracking the coalition and further weakening their cause. In the current climate of a fragmented opposition and the indecisiveness of the International Community, this going-alone initiative will not prove to be conducive to the process of creating a consensus inside and outside Syria to end the dictatorship that has lasted nearly 50 years.

EGYPT: FROM REVOLUTION TO ANARCHY

Two years after the start of the uprising and the election of Egypt's first president in a fair and transparent process, the country is reaching the point of collapse under the weight of contentious protests and violent clashes between police and gangs of youth.

A concoction of small secular parties, remnants of the old regime, Arab nationalists and gangs of youth who found new identity and shared values through the wide use of social networking sites managed to paralyse the country during the best part of last year and into the New Year.

The new Egyptian president, Muhammad Morsi was left alone to deal with remnants of the old regime. The Supreme Constitutional Court which was primarily appointed by the ousted president vowed to destabilise the new government and the president through old legislation and annulling new laws and newly elected assemblies. The Supreme constitutional court went out of its judicial professionalism to the extent when Tahani al-Gebali, Egypt's deputy

president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, urged army generals to block the Muslim Brotherhood's political arm from reaching power. Al-Gebali reportedly added that she started to help the military council draft a set of binding constitutional rules that would protect it from the oversight of a civilian government. She also reportedly urged the SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) to dissolve the democratically-elected parliament, which was dominated by Islamists.

"I knew the elections would bring a majority from the movements of political Islam," Judge al-Gebali told the *New York Times* Cairo bureau chief, David Kirkpatrick.

The main argument of the opposition against the new government is that elections at the time being would ultimately bring Islamists to power. Hence, they believe it is better to wait until such time when the secular, Arab national movement and other leftist parties organise and regroup to offer a viable option for the Egyptian people. The Salvation

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Al-Baradei is emboldened by support from countries in the Gulf region such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Senior members of the ousted Mubarak regime found a welcome refuge in the UAE.

Front is championing this call, their strategy is to put the government and the newly elected president in a difficult situation forcing him to delay parliamentary elections and incorporate the fragmentary and small leftists and secular parties in a unity government until such time when they become ready for elections.

The Salvation Front accuses Morsi of failure to fulfill the objectives of the revolution that brought him to power. It is a charge no one can seriously believe since members of the Salvation Front called the army to intervene and topple the first democratically elected president. Furthermore, the front vehemently backed and assisted Mubarak's Supreme Constitutional Court in its struggle with the elected parliament which led to its dissolution by the Court.

The front, led by Nobel Peace laureate Mohammed al-Baradei, has rejected all calls by Morsi for dialogue, saying it lacks seriousness and a clear agenda. Al-Baradei is emboldened by support from countries in the Gulf region

such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Senior members of the ousted Mubarak regime found a welcome refuge in the UAE. They were given all the help needed in managing their war with the Egyptian government. Ahmed Shafiq, the disgraced presidential candidate who is implicated in a number of corruption charges in Egypt, is spearheading the anti-Morsi campaign from Abu Dhabi.

Other reasons for the current impasse and the continued mayhem are the inability of the Egyptian institutions to shoulder the responsibility and put an end to the gradual collapse of the economy. The Police in particular stand accused of past atrocities against the demonstrators during the Mubarak era. Many of its officers are currently accused of murder in the Egyptian courts. They are trying very hard to restrain their actions to rebuild their shattered reputation. While the army does not want to play a policing role, their image was untarnished during the past two years. People look at the army with respect and appreciation for their national role in protecting Egyptian sovereignty.

On the other hand, the judicial institution, including the Supreme Constitutional Court, high ranking civil servants, the media and big private sector companies are making the life of the government very difficult. The media in particular is playing a big role in agitating the demonstrators against the president. They believe that new elected institutions will purge the aforementioned organisation from people loyal to Mubarak and his ousted regime.

Amidst all of this, the president and his government stand unable to rely on the army, the police or the judiciary to impose calm and law and order on the Egyptian streets. Moreover, his Islamist allies lacked the strategy and ability to dampen the street protests or reach out to the young activists who are demonstrating on a daily basis in Tahrir Square and other Egyptian cities.

To the contrary, the spokesperson of the Salafi al-Noor Party held talks with the secular Salvation Front and reached some sort of an agreement on the principle of a national unity

government and the sacking of the attorney general who was appointed by president Morsi.

Finally, one would expect that the highest religious authority in Egypt, namely al-Azhar, will side with the president and the Islamist political parties. However, for the president and his allies, al-Azhar is trying to fork out an independent political position for the first time in nearly two centuries. This non-political alignment is due to the fact that al-Azhar is divided internally on a handful of theological and political trends. There is the mainstream Sunni approach the apolitical Sufis, the reformist trend of the 20th century which is characterised by the Muslim Brotherhood, and the puritanist Salafi trend which emerged with the creation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The last trend is also divided into different strains depending on its approach to politics and its position in regards to the legitimacy of the current Arab and Muslim political leadership.

In Egypt, Arab nationalism, a strong Coptic Christian minority



and a strong secular tradition are all apparent. These factors militated against greater control over Egyptian politics by the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. The relative political freedom the Egyptians enjoyed under the Mubarak regime contributed to the diversity of Islamic thought and practice, making it very difficult for the Islamic current as a whole to unite in the political domain.

Empirical evidence from other Arab countries in the region proves this point. The rise of a plethora of Islamist trends in Iraq, for example, after occupation in 2003, did not bring about a unified Islamic political strategy. On the contrary, the sharp competition between the Islamist trends prompted a large number of the competing groups to support secular political parties rather than the list championed by the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), the political arm of the Brotherhood in the 2010 general elections.

The Islamists' moral and religious dimension will remain an

important component of the political scene in the Arab and Muslim world. As a moral religious discourse, Islamism will survive its political limitations in contemporary societies.

THE **UAE** GOVERNMENT CIRCUMVENTS DEMOCRATIC ASPIRATIONS WITH IMPUNITY

In March 2011, 132 citizens signed a petition requesting the Federal National Council be wholly elected and possess full jurisdiction over the legislative process. The crackdown by UAE security services began with the arrest of five individuals who became known as the 'UAE 5'. This group included an Economics Professor at the Abu Dhabi campus of the Sorbonne's University; and a prominent and internationally awarded human rights activist. Following eight months of detention, the men were put on trial and convicted of insulting the rulers; after being sentenced to a prison sentence of five years the President pardoned the group but their convictions remained.

Throughout 2012 the authorities arbitrarily detained 77 advocates of political reform, which included high profile lawyers, judges, teachers, Islamists and student leaders. Sixty-six of those held have ties to the domestic organisation al-Islah. Al-Islah is a civil society group established in 1974, which has been active in the educational and charitable sectors advocating for political reforms and greater public freedoms in the UAE.

The government's campaign did not stop at the advocates of political reform. People active on social media sites have been monitored and arrested in the past few months.

Human Rights activists in the United Arab Emirates have suggested that these arrests relate to attempts by the security services to find the owner of the Twitter account @weldbudhabi. This Twitter account has over 11,000 followers and has provided a consistent headache to the security services with its covering of the crackdown. The account has supported freedom and democracy in the UAE and the owner of it states he is not an Islamist; in the past the account has supported the UAE 5 group from 2011, when five liberal activists were imprisoned due to their support for democratic reform.

Although the United Arab Emirates has avoided the street protests witnessed in other countries throughout the Arab Spring, in recent weeks there have been growing gatherings of detainees' families demanding that their relatives be either put on trial or released. Criticism of the UAE



Cameron failed to raise the growing concerns on the human rights record of the Emirates.

government has been in short supply, with a sole European Parliament resolution in October 2012 being the only public statement denouncing the UAE's worsening human rights record.

Last year the *New York Times* uncovered the story that the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi has hired a private army of Columbian mercenaries. The Columbian general that was responsible for recruitment for this army stated that one of the reasons for its establishment was 'to take control of civil uprisings'. Prime Minister David Cameron recently journeyed to the UAE as part of a trade visit and stated that there are 'no no-go areas' with respect to the relationship between the UAE and UK. However, Cameron failed to raise the growing concerns on the human rights record of the Emirates.

Other European countries are queuing to sell arms and other security equipment to the UAE government. In the current climate of economic austerity, the human and political rights activists stand no chance of being defended by Western governments.

TUNISIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ASSASSINATION OF A POLITICAL OPPOSITION LEADER

Few have doubted that the assassination of a leftist political leader would cause such an outcry against the incumbent government and against al-Nahda, the ruling political party with Islamic leaning.

On the day of the burial of Shukri Bel Eid, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets chanting against al-Nahda and the Salafi Islamist trends in Tunisia. France joined the bandwagon when its Foreign Minister, Manuell Valls denounced Bel Eid's killing as an attack on "the values of Tunisia Jasmine revolution". As in Egypt, the political battle in Tunisia is carried out on the streets of the capital after the failure of the opposition groups to muster a majority vote in the elections. In 2012 the moderate Islamic party al-Nahda won 89 seats in the constitutional assembly, by far the largest block in the assembly. Al-Nahda managed to lead a ruling coalition with the centre-left, secular congress for the Republic, and al-Takattol (Democratic Forum of Labour and Liberties/ FDTL).

Senior government positions were shared amongst these three main political parties. Al-Takattol leader Mustapha Ben Ja'far is serving as the President of the Assembly with CPR leader Monsif al-Marzuqi as President, and Hamadi al-Jibali, the Secretary-General of al-Nahda as the Prime Minister. The coalition government was marred by a contentious friction and suspensions due to divergent histories and ideologies.

The situation in Tunisia is a repeat of the Egyptian story. Secular and liberal movements and media syndicates, whose loyalties remain with their old political masters continue in their quest to destabilise the nascent democratic government based on their ideological schisms rather than policies and manifestos.

To shed more light on the current political deadlock, the International Crisis Group (13 February 2013) pinpointed the present political reality:

"Yet, such management has its limitations. An-Nahda finds

itself in an increasingly uncomfortable position, caught between non-Islamists who accuse it of excessive leniency and laxity in dealing with the security threat, and Salafis who denounce it whenever it takes a harder line. Based on circumstances – a flare-up in violence or a wave of arrests – the party is condemned by either the former or the latter.”

The ICG goes on further to describe the secular war of attrition on the government:

“There is not much doubt that the non-Islamist opposition has displayed excessive and premature alarm and that it sometimes levels unsubstantiated accusations. Nor is there much question that it is finding it hard to accept the reality of Islamists governing their country”.

To shed further light on the politics of al-Nahda, our researcher interviewed a member of its Shura Council (legislative committee), the highest organisational body in this religio-political movement.

The MENA Report (TMENAR): Al-Nahda called for a general meeting for its members on the 15th of Feb, what is the purpose for this meeting?

Member of the Shura Council (MSC): We will be looking into the Prime Minister’s suggestion to form a government of non-partisan technocrats.

TMENAR: Why did your Secretary-General, Prime Minister Hamadi al-Jibali call to replace the present government in spite of its rejection by his al-Nahda Party? Why didn’t he consult his colleagues in al-Nahda?

MSC: Our prime minister declared his initiative in light of the difficulties his coalition government has gone through in the past 12 months. He was faced with enormous obstacles both from within the government and from the political parties outside government.

Those who are in government refused to relinquish their

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Al-Nahda is working hard to form a government of political technocrats. We believe that the present stage is overtly political.

seats while those who are not in the coalition refused to take part to widen the coalition. Furthermore the assassination of Shukri Bel Eid, the General Secretary of the Democratic Patriot Movement, militated that the Prime Minister had to maneuver to dampen the political atmosphere and redirect the attentions from the security to the political level.

TMENAR: In your opinion, what is the nature of the next government?

MSC: Al-Nahda is working hard to form a government of political technocrats. We believe that the present stage is overtly political. It dictates a government made from the political parties that helped topple the previous regime. We need to protect the principles and objectives of the revolution. Al-Nahda showed a high level of rationalism and restraint when it kept its differences with the Prime Minister private, and worked hard to reach to a high level of understanding with Mr al-Jibali.

He is a very much respected figure among the grassroots of the movement and I don't think the differences in opinion will lead to a schism between him and his party.

TMENAR: Why did other parties in the coalition insist on replacing the Foreign and Justice Ministers?

MSC: I think the main reason is to marginalise both ministries and keeps it aloof from the influence of al-Nahda. They also claim that the family link between the leader of the al-Nahda Shaykh Rashid al-Ghanouchi and the Foreign Minister is the main reason behind the calls for the minister to resign. Anyway, all these demands will be on the agenda for discussion when the coalition sits at the negotiation table.

TMENAR: Were you surprised when the members of the French government criticised al-Nahda after the assassination of Bel Eid?

MSC: The French posture did not surprise us. France was

reserved towards the Tunisian revolution against Ben Ali. Furthermore, France has been traditionally against political Islam. Its secular tradition is very much against the mix between religion and politics.

Don't forget that our secular elite enjoys strong ties with the French elite, especially the socialist party. Most of our educated elite were trained and studied in France; their culture is overtly French.

TMENAR: How do you describe al-Nahda's relationship with the Salafi trend in Tunisia?

MSC: Tense; we try to persuade their leaderships to reject violence and take part in the political process. We believe that the Salafi trend could pose a grave danger to the political stability of the country if they resort to violence and their uncompromising political ideology. I think our efforts are bearing fruit in this direction. In the past two years we organised a number of national debates and seminars to

offer solutions and a roadmap outside the usual security measures for this phenomenon.

TMENAR: What are the similarities between what is happening in Egypt and Tunisia?

MSC: Both countries are pioneers in the Arab World when it comes to being exposed to the forces of modernity. Their secular elites share a strong opposition to the Islamic trend. However, al-Nahda managed to penetrate the secular defenses and establish an alliance with two of the biggest secular parties in Tunisia.

Chatham House, the British thinktank institution granted Shaykh Rashid al-Ghanouchi and President Monsif al-Marzuqi an award in recognition for this achievement.

Unfortunately, a number of secular forces in Tunisia tried very hard with the British thinktank to backtrack and withdraw the award but their efforts did not succeed.



At the time of this edition of The MENA Report going to print, we received news from Tunisia, confirming the resignation of Prime Minister Hamadi al-Jebali for failing to form a new government. He also declined his re-nomination by al-Nahda to head the next government.

The Tunisians are anxious to see what type of government al-Nahda and its partners will form. Will it be a government of national unity where all political parties are present which al-Nahda has been working to achieve? Or will it be a government of independent technocrats as al-Jebali suggested.

Whatever the outcome, the main issue here is that the latest events proves that al-Nahda is a prudent political force and Tunisian politics is on the right track.



مؤسسة قرطبة

The Cordoba Foundation

Level 7, Westgate House
Westgate Road, Ealing
London W5 1YY
United Kingdom

Telephone +44 (0) 20 8991 3370

Telephone +44 (0) 20 8991 3372

Facsimile +44 (0) 20 8991 3373

info@thecordobafoundation.com

www.thecordobafoundation.com

Cultures in Dialogue.



Twitter @CordobaFoundati(The Cordoba Foundation)